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We Are Not a Daubert State-But What Are We? Scientific
Evidence in North Carolina after Howerton
John M Conley' and Scott W. Gaylord2
I. Introduction
In June of 2004, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided
Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd. , which interpreted the standard for
admitting expert testimony under Rule 702 of the North Carolina
Rules of Evidence. The issue before the court was whether a
North Carolina trial court's gatekeeping responsibility under Rule
702 is the same as that imposed on the federal courts by the
Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,4 which requires an independent preliminary
assessment of whether the proffered expert testimony is both
reliable and relevant. The answer was an unequivocal "no."
In concept, the admissibility of expert testimony boils
down to a single question: How do you know that? Historically,
there have been two approaches to this question: the guild
approach and the independent scrutiny approach. Under the
former (the so-called Frye5 standard), experts are allowed to
constitute themselves as a guild and declare that their approach is
"generally accepted" among its members. The latter, or Daubert
standard, requires the trial court to go past the affirmations of guild
members and determine on its own whether the expert's evidence
is reliable.
In this state, the admissibility of expert testimony is
governed by North Carolina Rule of Evidence 702, which dates
1 William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law, University of North Carolina
School of Law.
2 Mr. Gaylord is an attorney with Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A. in
Charlotte, North Carolina. He received his J.D. from the University of Notre
Dame in 1999.
' 597 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. 2004).
4 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
5 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
back to 1975. Its text does not resolve the guild/independent
scrutiny question:
If scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion.6
The North Carolina rule is virtually identical to the version
of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in place when Daubert was
decided:
If scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.7
The official commentary to North Carolina Rule 702 underlines
the obvious: "The rule is identical to Fed. R. Evid. 702, except
that the words 'or otherwise' which appear at the end of the federal
rule after the word 'opinion' have been deleted.",8
By itself, this near-identity of language might imply an
intent on the part of North Carolina's rulemakers to promote the
same results in state and federal court. This inference is
strengthened by the commentary to North Carolina Rule 102:
Uniformity of evidence rulings in the courts of this
state and federal courts is one motivating factor in
adopting these rules and should be a goal of our
courts in construing those rules that are identical.9
As we shall see, however, those of us who had long drawn this
apparently obvious inference about Rule 702 would be proven
wrong.
6 N.C. R. EvID. 702.
7 FED. R. EVID. 702 (prior to 2000 amend.).
8 N.C. R. EVID. 702 cmt.
9 N.C. R. EVID. 102 cmt.; State v. Bogle, 376 S.E.2d 745, 752 (1989) (making
same point).
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II. The Federal Daubert Standard
In Daubert, the plaintiffs sued to recover for birth defects
that allegedly resulted from pregnant women's ingestion of the
anti-nausea drug Bendectin. The plaintiffs proffered eight experts
to testify that, despite 30 published studies finding no connection
between Bendectin and birth defects, Bendectin actually does
cause birth defects if ingested by mothers in the first trimester.
The district court and the Ninth Circuit evaluated and rejected this
evidence 1° under the "general acceptability" standard of Frye v.
United States, which had been decided in 1923 and was still
followed in most federal and state courts.' 1 Under Frye, in order
for an expert's opinion to be admissible, "the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."'
12
Thus, the proponent had to define a relevant field and then show
that the expert's technique was generally accepted in that field.
The Daubert Court rejected the Frye standard in no
uncertain terms: "That austere standard, absent from, and
incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be
applied in federal trials."' 3 Instead, federal district judges would
now be required to scrutinize expert evidence for reliability:
That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of
Evidence does not mean, however, that the Rules
themselves place no limits on the admissibility of
purportedly scientific evidence. ... To the
contrary, under the Rules the trial judge must ensure
that any and all scientific testimony or evidence
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.
14
The Court based the new standard on the "scientific knowledge"
10 727 F. Supp. 570, 575-76 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (granting summary judgment),
aff'd, 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991).
11 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also
Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme Court's Trilogy on the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 9, 11 (2d ed. 2000).
12 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added).
13 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
14 id.
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language of Rule 702:
Proposed testimony must be supported by
appropriate validation-i.e., "good grounds," based
on what is known. In short, the requirement that an
expert's testimony pertain to "scientific knowledge"
establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.'5
To guide the trial court in performing its new "gatekeeping"
duties, the Court offered a list of four non-exclusive factors to be
considered-now known universally as the "Daubert factors."
The first three are classic hallmarks of "hard" or "positivist"
science, such as physics, while the fourth is a watered-down
restatement of Frye:16 (1) whether the expert's technique or theory
"can be (and has been) tested"; (2) whether the theory or technique
"has been subjected to peer review and publication"; (3) the known
or potential rate of error and the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique's operation"; and (4)
'" [g]eneral acceptance' can yet have a bearing on the inquiry."' 7
The case was remanded to the Ninth Circuit for review under the
new standard, and the Ninth Circuit ultimately rejected the
plaintiffs' evidence again. 18
Since Daubert dealt exclusively with the question of
scientific expert testimony, it was unclear how the federal trial
courts should deal with the Rule 702 categories of "technical or
other specialized knowledge." The Supreme Court addressed this
issue in the 1999 case of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.19 The
Court held preliminarily that Daubert's requirement of
independent scrutiny-gatekeeping--extended to all forms of
expert evidence. However, non-scientific evidence should be
evaluated under a more flexible standard:
[T]he test of reliability is "flexible," and Daubert's
15Id. at 590.
16 For a discussion of Daubert's choice of the positivist model, see John M.
Conley & David W. Peterson, The Science of Gatekeeping: The Federal
Judicial Center's New Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 74 N.C. L.
Rev. 1183, 1201-04 (1996).
7 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94 (internal citations omitted).
18 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir.
1995).
'9 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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list of specific factors neither necessarily nor
exclusively applies to all experts or in every case.
Rather, the law grants a district court the same
broad latitude when it decides how to determine
reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate
reliability determination.
20
The final installment in the federal story was an
amendment to Rule 702 in 2000 that was intended to conform its
language to the logic of Daubert and Kumho Tire. It now reads:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or
data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case. T
III. North Carolina Before Howerton
The North Carolina cases before Howerton can be
described as "Daubert lite," or perhaps "Frye heavy." North
Carolina courts talked the Daubert talk but often failed to walk the
Daubert walk, leading to some-to these observers-unusual
admissibility decisions. To be fair to the North Carolina courts,
state trial courts generally are not well equipped to do the work
that Daubert requires. Most federal courts that are faced with
difficult Rule 702 decisions now conduct extensive "Daubert
20 Id. at 141-42.
21 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's notes to the 2000 amendment
(confirming that its purpose was to conform Rule 702 to the United States
Supreme Court case law).
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hearings," often on motions in limine to exclude the evidence.22
But federal district judges keep cases from beginning to end and
have the assistance of full-time law clerks. North Carolina
superior court judges, who often see a case for the first time during
an all-comers motion session, have neither of these advantages.
Because exclusion of expert testimony can be fatal to a plaintiff's
claim, North Carolina judges are understandably reluctant to sound
the death knell of cases they barely know.
Below is a timeline of critical North Carolina cases, against
the background of the federal developments:
The North Carolina Cases
Timeline
I I I I I I I
1974 1984 1990 1993 1995 1999 2000
Crowder Pennington Goode AmendedFRE 702
Bullard Daubert Kumho
Tire
The key facts in those North Carolina cases were as follows:
" State v. Bullard:23 footprint comparison by a physical
anthropologist admissible
" State v. Pennington:24 DNA identification admissible
22 See William W. Schwarzer & Joe S. Cecil, Management of Expert Evidence,
in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
39, 53-54 (2d ed. 2000).
23 322 S.E.2d 370 (N.C. 1984).
24 393 S.E.2d 847 (N.C. 1990).
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* State v. Crowder:25 "gunshot residue test" admissible
* State v. Goode:2 6 forensic serologist's "bloodstain pattern
analysis" admissible
27
In Crowder, Bullard, and Pennington, all of which were
decided before Daubert, the North Carolina Supreme Court made
three essential points: It (1) rejected Frye's "general acceptance"
test; (2) adopted reliability as the touchtone for admissibility; and
(3) applied a nonexhaustive list of Daubert-like factors.
Each of the cases emphasized reliability. According to
Crowder, for example, "[s]cientific tests ... are competent only
when shown to be reliable. 28 Bullard stressed reliability where
the technique in question had not previously been admitted: "In
general, when no specific precedent exists, scientifically accepted
reliability justifies admission of the testimony of qualified
witnesses." 29 Additionally, Pennington seemed to read reliability
into the Frye test: "Believing that the inquiry underlying the Frye
formula is one of the reliability of the scientific method rather than
its popularity within a scientific community, we have focused on
... indices of reliability.
'
"
30
But, despite its professed concern with reliability,
Pennington's "indices of reliability" seem to have little to do with
Daubert's independent determination of whether an opinion is
based on scientific knowledge. Instead, the North Carolina
25 203 S.E.2d 38, 46 (N.C. 1974), vacated inpart on other grounds, 428 U.S.
903 (1976).
26461 S.E.2d 631 (N.C. 1995).
27 North Carolina courts have addressed the validity of expert testimony in a
variety of fields. Compare State v. Barnes, 430 S.E.2d 223, 231 (N.C. 1993)
(holding blood group testing for identification purposes admissible), and State v.
Rogers, 64 S.E.2d 572, 577-79 (N.C. 1951) (finding fingerprint analysis
admissible), and State v. Temple, 273 S.E.2d 273, 279-81 (N.C. 1981) (finding
bite mark analysis admissible), with State v. Hall, 412 S.E.2d 883, 891 (N.C.
1992) (finding expert's testimony that victim suffered from a form of post-
traumatic stress disorder inadmissible as substantive evidence of rape) and State
v. Peoples, 319 S.E.2d 177, 188 (N.C. 1984) (finding hypnotically refreshed
testimony inadmissible) and State v. Grier, 300 S.E.2d 351, 361 (N.C. 1983)
(finding results of polygraph testing inadmissible).
28 203 S.E.2d at 46.
29 322 S.E.2d at 381 (citation omitted).
30 393 S.E.2d at 852-53.
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Supreme Court stressed
the expert's use of established techniques, the
expert's professional background in the field, the
use of visual aids before the jury so that the jury is
not asked "to sacrifice its independence by
accepting the scientific hypothesis on faith," and
independent research conducted by the expert.3'
The final consideration-"independent research" versus that
conducted as a "hired gun"-has been stressed by the federal
courts, including the Ninth Circuit on remand in Daubert itself.
But the "use of established techniques" seems right out of Frye,
and the use of visual aids is difficult to understand as an indicator
of reliability. Does something become more reliable if you put it
on a PowerPoint slide?32
The North Carolina cases have also used specific analytical
factors that resemble the first three Daubert factors, but with
significant distinctions. With respect to testability (the first factor),
for example, Bullard approved the admission of expert testimony
where "'the experts did not rely on untested methods, unproved
hypotheses, intuition or revelation. Rather, they applied
scientifically and professionally established techniques."' 33 Is this
Frye or Daubert? Concerning the second factor, peer-reviewed
publication, Crowder considered the expert's professed experience
in the field, the fact that the expert had "presented technicalpapers
on the subject to various associations offorensic scientists," and
34the existence of independent research. Is this scientific peer
31 393 S.E.2d at 853 (citations omitted).
32 Under Pennington, expert testimony is admissible only if it is reliable, i.e.,
only if it "will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact at issue." N.C. R. EVID. 702. But there is nothing intrinsic to a visual aid
that guarantees that its content is reliable or will assist the trier of fact. Thus,
relying on visual aids serves only to push the reliability inquiry back another
layer. A particular visual aid that is proffered by an expert should be admissible
under Pennington only if it is reliable, which cannot be established by the visual
aid itself. See, e.g., Leatherwood v. Ehlinger, 564 S.E.2d 883, 889 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2002) ("[U]nless an expert's testimony.., is sufficiently reliable, it is not
considered competent evidence and therefore should not be presented to the
jury.").
33 322 S.E.2d at 381 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
14 203 S.E.2d at 46 (emphasis added).
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review, or simply general acceptance by a mutually reinforcing
guild? On rate of error (the third factor), Crowder approved of a
gun shot residue test because, according to a contemporary
manual, "' [n]o false tests were obtained nor failure of tests to
detect"' the subject elements. 35 But is it really a zero error rate
when a test-according to its proponents-always proves what the
prosecution intends it to prove?
The final, and most controversial, pre-Howerton case was
State v. Goode, in which the North Carolina Supreme Court
allowed the testimony of a bloodstain pattern expert. To many
observers (including, as we shall see, the Court of Appeals), Goode
appeared to endorse Daubert as the North Carolina standard:
Thus, under our Rules of Evidence, when a trial
court is faced with the proffer of expert testimony, it
must determine whether the expert is proposing to
testify to scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to
determine a fact in issue. As recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in... [Daubert], this
requires a preliminary assessment of whether the
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony
is sufficiently valid and whether that reasoning or
methodology can be properly applied to the facts in
issue.36
IV. Howerton
Bruce Howerton, a dentist, was involved in a catastrophic
motorcycle accident that resulted in a broken neck and left him in a
quadriplegic condition. Dr. Howerton sued Arai, the manufacturer
of his helmet, alleging negligent design. Specifically, he
contended that a fixed (versus flexible) chin bar would have
prevented the hyperflexion of his neck that caused the damage to
35 Id. (citation omitted; emphasis added).
36 461 S.E.2d at 639 (emphasis added). Goode also appeared to anticipate the
holding in Kumho Tire, holding that reliability is the touchtone of admissibility
"whether the expert is proposing to testify to scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge." Id.
ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN NCSPRING 2005"1
his spinal cord. He proffered four expert witnesses to establish
causation.
37
Arai moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
plaintiff's experts' opinions were unreliable and thus inadmissible
and that the plaintiff could not make a prima facie case without
them. After reviewing the transcripts of the experts' depositions,
Superior Court Judge Wade Barber granted the motion in an
exceptionally detailed and careful opinion (quoted at length by the
Court of Appeals).38 Judge Barber began with the legal
proposition that Goode had confirmed North Carolina's adoption
of Daubert. He then applied a Daubert-like analysis to the
experts' opinions and rejected each in turn. The Court of Appeals,
sharing Judge Barber's view of Goode, affirmed: "From a
thorough review of our case law, it is eminently clear that North
Carolina has adopted the Daubert analysis. This is not novel.
Daubert has been the prevailing law in this state since Goode. 3 9
The Court of Appeals then endorsed the trial court's
analyses of the four experts. The first was Professor Hugh Hurt, a
head safety researcher and emeritus professor at the University of
Southern California, and an expert in motorcycle accident
reconstruction and helmet design. His opinion that the absence of
a fixed chin bar caused Dr. Howerton's injury was based on the
reconstruction of three motorcycle accidents in which the
respective riders had a "U" or "V" shaped mark on their chests and
wore helmets with fixed (or integrated) chin bars. His testimony
was deemed properly excluded because Professor Hurt (1) had not
tested his hypothesis; (2) had not subjected it to peer review; (3)
had published work contradicting his current theory; (4) could not
quantify the extent, if any, to which a fixed chin bar would have
prevented forward flexion of the neck; and (5) could not identify
any published works supporting his hypothesis. 40
37 Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674, 677-78 (N.C. 2004).
38 Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 581 S.E.2d 816, 820-22 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003),
rev'd, 597 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. 2004).39 1d. at 826.40 d. at 819-20. Professor Hurt probably did not advance his cause by testifying
in deposition, "Like Bo knows baseball, Hurt knows motorcycle accidents."
The Court of Appeals noted this statement but disclaimed any reliance on it. Id.
at 827 n.9.
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ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN NC
The plaintiff's second expert was Dr. William Hutton, an
Emory University orthopedist and expert in biomechanics. He,
too, opined that Arai's flexible chin guard design caused Dr.
Howerton's neck to enter into a state of hyperflexion, which
caused his quadriplegia. Dr. Hutton's testimony was excluded
because Dr. Hutton (1) never researched, tested, or published his
hypothesis; (2) had never dealt with a similar injury and could not
cite medical or scientific literature that supported his hypothesis;
and (3) stated that the injury could have occurred in the absence of
hyperflexion.
4 1
The next witness was Dr. Charles Rawlings, an expert in
neurosurgery. A Duke University medical graduate, he had served
a ten-year residency at Duke during which he performed many
surgical procedures. At the time of his deposition, he was a law
student at Wake Forest University. He testified that Dr. Howerton
did not suffer any cervical injuries, including his paralysis, until his
head rotated forward beyond the normal range of motion. Dr.
Rawlings's testimony was excluded because he (1) had not tested
his hypothesis; (2) had not subjected it to peer review; (3)
conceded that there were no objective criteria that could be used to
affirm his hypothesis; and (4) conceded that one could not
determine the degree of flexion without knowing the amount of
force in the accident and that he did not know the amount of
force.42
Finally, the plaintiff offered James Hooper, a design
engineer and expert in helmet design. He also proposed to testify
that a full face helmet with an integrated chin bar would have
prevented Dr. Howerton's quadriplegia. Mr. Hooper's testimony
was excluded because he (1) admitted that he did not have the
expertise to opine that an integrated chin bar would have prevented
the injury and (2) could not, therefore, establish a reliable
foundation for his opinion.43
The Court of Appeals affirmed the rejection of all four
experts. It held that the trial judge had properly exercised his
41 Id. at 820-21.
4 2 1d. at 821.
4 31Id. at 821-22.
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gatekeeping function under Daubert/Goode44 and that his specific
application of the Daubert factors had been a proper exercise of his
"'wide discretion. ' 'A 5
In reversing, the North Carolina Supreme Court
conclusively rejected the idea that North Carolina is a Daubert
state: "Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, it is not
'eminently clear' that North Carolina adopted the Daubert
standard. 4 6 It found no warrant for that assertion in Goode4 7 or
any other case. On the contrary, the Supreme Court concluded,
"the North Carolina approach is decidedly less mechanistic and
rigorous than the 'exacting standards of reliability' demanded by
the federal approach. 'A 8 As a policy matter, the court expressed
particular concern about cases that depend on scientific evidence
being decided at the motion stage-exactly what happened in
Howerton:
As a consequence of these stringent threshold
standards for admitting expert testimony, we are
concerned with the case-dispositive nature of
Daubert proceedings, whereby parties... may use
pre-trial motions to exclude expert testimony under
Daubert to bootstrap motions for summary
judgment that otherwise would not likely succeed.49
So serious is the problem, the court wrote, that it threatens to reach
"Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that
In Goode, our Supreme Court, relying on Daubert, expressly
held that the first inquiry a trial court must make in
determining the admissibility of expert testimony is whether
"the method of proof is sufficiently reliable." This makes
sense, because "unless an expert's testimony.., is sufficiently
reliable, it is not considered competent evidence and therefore
should not be presented to the jury."
Id. at 825.
45 Id. at 827 (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court had
previously held that a trial court's Daubert gatekeeping decision should be
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. See General Electric Co. v.
Joyner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
46 Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674, 689 (2004).
47 Id. (including "but one reference to Daubert").
48Id. at 690.
49 Id. at 691.
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constitutional status:
[T]rial courts asserting sweeping pre-trial
"gatekeeping" authority under Daubert may
unnecessarily encroach upon the constitutionally-
mandated function of the jury to decide issues of
fact and to assess the weight of the evidence.5 °
In place of Daubert, the Supreme Court prescribed a three-
step admissibility test that, it said, is rooted in Pennington and
Goode: (1) "Is the expert's proffered method of proof sufficiently
reliable?"; (2) "Is the witness ... qualified as an expert in that
area?"; and (3) "Is the expert's testimony relevant?",5
1
With respect to reliability, trial courts should seek to follow
precedent. But where the court is "without precedential guidance
or faced with novel scientific theories, unestablished techniques, or
compelling new perspectives," it should look to "nonexclusive
'indices of reliability."' These indices, derived from Pennington,
include the "use of established techni ues," 52 the "expert's
professional background in the field,"53 the "use of visual aids,
54
and "independent research conducted by the expert., 55 As noted
earlier, the first of these is the old Frye test, minimally reworded.56
Professional background is a matter of qualifications-but
qualifications to do what? Do qualifications in, say, neurosurgery,
necessarily lend reliability to an opinion about the biomechanical
effect of a helmet design in a particular accident? The significance
of visual aids remains something of a mystery to these authors,
while independent (versus hired-gun) research seems a reasonable
proxy for reliability. Turning to what the court did not say, it is
unclear whether a trial judge could properly add the specific
Daubert factors to this list of non-exclusive indices. Nor is it clear
whether the trial court can follow Goode and consider whether the
proffered expert's "reasoning or methodology can be properly
50 Id. at 692.
51 Id. at 686.
52 State v. Pennington, 393 S.E.2d 847, 853 (1990).
53 id.
54 id.
55 id.56 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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applied to the facts in issue.57 Moreover, the court did not have
occasion to consider the role of Rule 403, which balances
probative value against potential~rejudice, in deciding on the
admissibility of expert evidence.
Because the two lower courts had acted under a
misapprehension of the applicable legal standard, the Supreme
Court remanded the case "for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion., 59 The hard question is what those proceedings
should look like.60 A few things are clear. First, North Carolina
trial judges should not get into the habit (as their federal
counterparts are often accused of doing) of routinely disposing of
civil cases at the pre-trial stage. Summary judgment against civil
plaintiffs has always been disfavored in North Carolina, and it
should remain so. Rule 702 is not to be treated as a command to
alter that balance.
Nonetheless, trial judges should examine the reliability of
expert witnesses; the assumed mantle of expertise does not confer
the right to say anything at all. But that said, the Howerton
approach is clearly much more deferential to experts than Daubert
has proved to be. Under Howerton, qualifications are an indication
of the reliability of an expert's opinion. It is difficult to read this
as other than a directive to give more latitude-in all directions-
to experts with impressive credentials. Moreover, courts should
respect precedent with respect to particular categories of opinions.
While it makes sense not to require overworked and poorly
supported trial judges to reinvent the wheel, this rule is an
invitation to keep making the same mistake over and over again.
In the federal courts, long-established forensic techniques
like handwriting analysis have been successfully attacked on the
17 461 S.E.2d at 639.58 N.C. R. EvID. 403.
" 597 S.E.2d at 694. In an interesting partial dissent, Justice Parker agreed that
North Carolina is not a Daubert state. She believed, however, that the trial
judge's analysis should stand as an appropriate exercise of discretion under the
correct Pennington standard. Id. at 694-95.60 The authors have been advised orally that Howerton has been settled on
undisclosed terms.
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basis of new, independent assessments of reliability. 61 Such
attacks, which clearly advance the interests of justice, seem far less
likely in this state after Howerton. The anthropologist who
testified about footprints in Bullard was subsequently exposed as
utterly unreliable, and anyone who has ever heard a blood spatter
expert testify might suspect that such evidence (as in Goode) was
ripe for rigorous independent scrutiny. Under the logic of
Howerton, however, it will be difficult to persuade trial courts to
reach different results.
V. Conclusion
Overall, North Carolina has become more Frye-like after
Howerton, adhering more closely to the guild approach. General
acceptance-by credentialing authorities, by other experts, and by
the courts-now seems almost conclusive on the issue of
reliability. University of North Carolina professor Kenneth Broun
has predicted that Howerton will create a "presumption of
admissibility," arguing that "the North Carolina Supreme Court
may have effectively shifted the burden of demonstrating
reliability on the part of the proponent of the evidence [as under
Daubert] to a burden of demonstrating unreliability on the
opponent." 63 We believe that he is correct. All of the signals in
Howerton trend in favor of admissibility: the trial courts should
not mimic their federal counterparts; summary judgment should
not become routine; judges should not encroach on the jury's
province, confusing admissibility with weight; qualifications
should be respected; and established rules of admissibility for
particular categories of evidence should generally be followed.
Professor Broun is correct to characterize these signals as a
reversal of the burden. It is a burden that, we predict, opponents of
scientific evidence will rarely be able to meet.
It is an interesting hypothetical exercise to apply the rules
61 See, e.g., 2 DAvID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 22-
1.4 (1997) (discussing challenges to handwriting evidence).
62 Kenneth S. Broun, Scientific Evidence in North Carolina After Howerton-A
Presumption ofAdmissibility, N.C. ST. BAR J. 8, 12 (Spring 2005).631d. at 11.
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of Howerton to the facts of the same case-the task for the remand
that has been rendered moot. We believe that the testimony of the
three experts with "Doctor" before their names would have been
admitted easily. All were abundantly qualified to testify about
something like that on which they opined. Their general
qualifications would have overwhelmed any reservations about the
link between those qualifications and the specifics of their
opinions. In the instances of the two medical doctors, this state's
longstanding respect for physicians' ability to testify about the
causes of disease and injury would have been a powerful additional
factor. Even "Mr." Hooper would almost certainly have survived.
Given Rule 702's emphasis on the broad range of possible
qualifications-"knowledge, skill, training, experience, or
education"-his practical engineering background would likely
have persuaded the court to give him fairly free rein to opine. The
only basis for excluding any of these experts would be to apply the
Daubert factors rigorously, as the trial court did. Without this
option, it seems most unlikely that the defendant could have
overcome Professor Broun's presumption.
It is thus tempting to conclude that Howerton will be read
as a mandate to admit almost anything, in both civil and criminal
cases. (As an aside, Howerton created a conflict between two
groups that are usually aligned: the civil plaintiff's bar, who
opposed a Daubert standard, and the criminal defense bar, who
favored it.) 64 One alternative possibility is that trial judges will
take up the invitation in Justice Parker's separate Howerton
opinion to conduct rigorous, Daubert-like scrutiny of expert
testimony under the rubric of Pennington.65 Because such scrutiny
was so rare even when it appeared that North Carolina had adopted
Daubert, we think it unlikely as a practical matter. And because
no other Justice signed Justice Parker's opinion, we think it equally
unlikely that a trial judge who did so would get away with it. The
law of North Carolina is, in our judgment, that all but transparent
64 See Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 677 (noting that North Carolina Academy of
Trial Lawyers, North Carolina Conference for District Attorneys, and North
Carolina Association of Defense Attorneys all filed amicus briefs, the latter
joining with the North Carolina Citizens for Business and Industry).65 See supra note 59.
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quacks are to be given the benefit of the doubt and left to the
critical faculties of juries.
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